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Abstract   
We analyze the effects of judicial errors on the innovative activity of firms. Successful research investment allows 
to take a new action that may be ex-post welfare enhancing or welfare decreasing (illegal). Deterrence in this 
setting works by affecting both the incentives to invest in research and the ex-post choice of the action (marginal 
deterrence). The two goals may contrast each other and their relative importance shapes the optimal policy. For 
increasing probabilities of social harm, the enforcer initially promotes research and disregards marginal 
deterrence: in this case no accuracy is chosen and the policy adopts first a per-se legality and then a (moderately 
enforced) per-se illegality rule. Conversely, for higher likelihood of social harm, the enforcer favors marginal 
deterrence eliciting the ex-post efficient actions at the cost of depressing firm’s investment: the optimal policy calls 
for positive .nes and improved accuracy, with a stronger effort to reduce type-I than type-II errors and the 
adoption of asymmetric protocols of investigation. Improved accuracy allows to discriminate between beneficial 
and harmful actions, an instance of effect-based legal standard. 
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  1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the e⁄ects of judicial errors on ￿rms￿innovative
activity. Quite often norms are required to rule delicate issues involving innovative environ-
ments, such as the design of liability rules for genetically modi￿ed (GM) organisms or the
application of antitrust norms in high-tech industries. In these settings, there is widespread
concern about the long term impacts of the design and enforcement of norms on the rate
of innovative activity. For instance, a recurrent theme in competition policy claims that
antitrust legislation should prevent abuses by dominant ￿rms without chilling competition
on the merits. Moreover, in enforcing rules applied to novel and innovative issues, errors
becomes more likely than in standardized situations, and judicial errors are a major concern.
In order to address these issues, we argue that an enrichment of the traditional model of
law enforcement is needed, applying then this richer set-up to judicial errors. Let us discuss
the two steps in a sequence.
Law enforcement in innovative environments. The traditional approach of the
Law and Economics (L&E) literature is not appropriate to address these problems because,
in its basic set-up, it considers the choices of private agents among a set of feasible actions,
some of which may cause a social damage and are therefore considered unlawful. In this
setting the feasible actions are perfectly known and implementable by the individuals, the
only restraint from taking harmful acts being the expected ￿nes associated to illegal prac-
tices. The analysis focusses on the ability of law enforcement to in￿ uence individuals in their
choice among (harmful) actions, which represents the very notion of marginal deterrence1.
This setting does not allow to fully address the issues we want to analyze. Consider the
design and application of legal rules in the above mentioned examples referred to the liability
issues in the production of genetically modi￿ed seeds, or to the antitrust issues in the design
of new products by dominant companies. In both cases the traditional problem, in which
the private agents choose among a set of known actions, corresponds to the ￿nal stage of a
process that initially requires investment in research to identify innovative solutions among
which the choice will be made in the end.2, 3 When ￿rms commit to a research investment,
1See Stigler (1970), Shavell (1992), Mookherjee and Png (1994), among others.
2To our knowledge, Kaplow (1995) is the only other paper where the design of the law a⁄ects agents￿
learning decisions. In his setting, more complex rules allow better control over individual behaviour but
are more di¢ cult for people to understand ex ante and for courts to apply ex post. In Kaplow￿ s setting,
individuals can choose not to learn, and to take actions ignoring the associated e⁄ects (and ￿nes). Our model
di⁄ers in that new actions can be taken only upon learning.
3This setting has some common elements with the so called "activity level" model: see, for instance,
Shavell (1980) and (2007) and Shavell and Polinsky (2000). According to this approach, private bene￿ts and
social harms depend on two di⁄erent decisions of private agents: a level of activity (how long the individual
￿1 ￿they still ignore its outcome and the e⁄ects of the new action that research may discover.
Hence, they may be unable to predict if the new actions will be considered lawful, according
to the existing norms.
Two features characterize these more complex situations: ￿rstly, private agents have a
richer set of decisions, as initially they must choose how much to invest in research and then,
if this is successful, select one among the innovative actions available; secondly, during the
innovative process the private agents not only discover how to implement the new actions,
but they may also learn the true state of the world, that is whether these latter will be
considered ex-post as lawful or unlawful according to the prescriptions of the legal rules.
The ex-ante inability to evaluate with certainty the social consequences (or legality) of
the innovative actions may be due to di⁄erent reasons. Uncertainty may be rooted in the
very nature of the research activity that the ￿rm has to perform, so that the features of
the innovation are unknown until discovery. For instance, in the example of the biotech
￿rm, experiments with a new GM seed may promise higher yields but may also pose un-
known risks to public health, that can be properly veri￿ed only once the research project
has been concluded. In other instances, uncertainty may derive from the interaction of
the innovation, whose properties may have been controlled and planned by the ￿rm with
su¢ cient con￿dence, with the economic or social environment at the time the innovation is
introduced. The future features of this environment, in turn, will depend on the decisions
of a very high number of other agents and cannot be assessed ex-ante with certainty. In our
second example, a dominant software company may invest in research to tie a new software
application into a new personal computer operating system: beyond the initial intent of the
company, the e¢ ciency and foreclosure e⁄ects of this new software will depend, at the time
of its commercial introduction, on the alternative packages and applications available from
competitors, which may be only imperfectly foreseen at the time of the research investment.
In this class of situations, deterrence works through an additional channel, by a⁄ecting
the initial incentives to invest in research: if private agents expect a very restrictive legal
treatment of the results of their innovative e⁄ort, they will have lower incentives to commit
resources to research. As a result, the innovative actions will be discovered and possibly
chosen with a lower probability.
Immordino, Pagano and Polo (2009) propose an analytical framework to address these
two features of deterrence, analyzing the choice among di⁄erent policy regime, namely
drives) and a level of precaution (the speed at which the agent drives). This literature focusses mainly on
comparison of di⁄erent liability rules (strict vs fault-based). In our paper the innovative e⁄ort resembles
to the activity while the choice of new actions parallels precaution. However, in our setting, the time and
information structure is di⁄erent, since innovative e⁄ort is taken before uncertainty is resolved and before
actions are chosen, while in the "activity level" model activity and precaution are chosen together and
uncertainty plays no role.
￿2 ￿laissez-faire, ex-post law enforcement and ex-ante authorizarion. The interplay of marginal
deterrence on the new actions and deterrence on research investment shapes the optimal
policies for di⁄erent priors on the expected harm of innovations. The impact of antitrust
enforcement in innovative industries is analyzed also in a paper by Segal and Whinston
(2007). Considering a sequence of innovations, the authors analyze the trade-o⁄ between
protecting the incumbents, by so doing increasing the rents of the winner and the incentives
to invest in innovation, and protecting the innovative entrants, that increases the rate of
technical progress. They derive conditions under which the latter e⁄ect is the dominant
one.
Errors. The two previous papers o⁄er interesting results on law enforcement when
innovative activity is a crucial component, but they do not consider judicial errors, the
second ingredient of this work. Judicial errors and their reduction, i.e. accuracy, are a
central concern in law enforcement: they have been analyzed in the standard model of law
enforcement proposed by Kaplow (1994), Kaplow and Shavell (1994, 1996), Polinsky and
Shavell (2000) and Png (1986) among others, which focusses on the (negative) impact of
such errors on marginal deterrence. In this framework, accuracy is always desirable, and it
is chosen optimally balancing the marginal bene￿ts and costs.
A more speci￿c literature on competition policy enforcement has considered the e⁄ects of
an inappropriate intervention by an antitrust authority. In a model of collusion, Schinkel and
Tuinstra (2006), ￿nd that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types
of enforcement errors: type II errors reduce expected ￿nes, while type I errors encourage
industries to collude when faced with the risk of a false conviction. Therefore, in their
framework as in the general literature on law enforcement accuracy is always desirable. In
Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009) a welfare analysis of legal standard is developed, comparing
per-se rules and discriminating (e⁄ect based) rules characterized by a lower probability of
errors. The authors identify some key elements that can help deciding the more appropriate
legal standard and the cases in which type-I or type-II accuracy is more desidable. In both
papers, as in the literature on accuracy quoted above, the general setting is consistent with
the standard set-up, in which the enforcer aims at in￿ uencing the choice of ￿rms among
(known and feasible) actions, while the issue of innovative activity is not considered.
Our contribution. From the previous discussion, we argue that the existing papers
on law enforcement in innovative environments do not consider judicial errors while these
latter have been studied in a set-up that is not ￿t to consider innovative environments. The
combination of these ingredients is the purpose of this paper. We adopt a set-up similar to
Immordino, Pagano and Polo (2009) introducing the possibility of judicial errors.
Errors in our model occur when assessing the social consequences (legality) of the new
￿3 ￿action, the more compelling task for the enforcer. Following the literature, we can distinguish
two types of errors: the enforcer can erroneously ￿ne the ￿rm when taking the new (socially
bene￿cial) action or mistakenly acquit the (socially damaging) new action.4
The enforcer sets the ￿ne and determines, through costly e⁄ort, the (type-I or type-II)
accuracy of the decision. In our setting, when the enforcer does not pursue any accuracy she
is (implicitly) adopting a per-se (legality or illegality) rule that does not discriminate the
e⁄ects, a property that instead can be optained through accuracy implementing an e⁄ect-
based rule. Hence, we are able not only to derive the optimal use of the policy instruments
but also the optimal legal standards.5
The main ￿ndings of our analysis can be summarized as follows. The enforcer shapes
the policy considering two e⁄ects: the impact of the ￿nes and accuracies on the ￿rm￿ s
choice of actions (marginal deterrence) and on its research investment. Concerning marginal
deterrence we can identify three di⁄erent cases that are implementable through the policy:
the enforcer may prevent the choice of the innovative action in any state of the world (status
quo), she may implement in each contingency the e¢ cient action (e¢ cient action), or she
may allow the ￿rm to choose the new action in any case (new action). We show that the ￿rst
two cases involve underinvestment in research compared to the ￿rst best, while in the third
case the research investment may be higher or lower than the welfare maximizing level.
In the new action case the enforcer gives up the possibility of in￿ uencing the ￿rm￿ s choice
of action and focusses on enhancing the incentives to research investment. This comes out
to be the more desirable option when innovation is ex-ante very bene￿cial. Indeed, when the
new action is very likely to produce a social gain, the optimal policy entails zero ￿nes and
no accuracy, an example of per-se legality rule (laissez-faire). As the probability of social
harm (unlawfulness) increases, ￿nes are progressively raised, still not improving accuracy,
moving to a moderately enforced per-se illegality rule. At some point, the optimal policy
shifts from the new to the e¢ cient action case, and marginal deterrence starts shaping the
policy: when the new action is more likely to produce a social damage, it becomes optimal
to prevent its adoption when harmful. Now the enforcer has to pursue two goals, sustaining
the research investment and preventing the ￿rm from choosing the new action when socially
harmful; the optimal policy requires to use both tools ￿￿nes and accuracy. However, type-I
errors are reduced more than type-II errors, a case of asymmetric accuracy. In this case the
4The ￿rst case corresponds to a type-I error in statistical inference and is labelled as a case of over-
enforcement or false positive in the L&E jargon, while the second entails a type-II error and involves under-
enforcement and false negative.
5The discussion on legal standards has occupied an important place in the recent debate on the enforce-
ment of competition policy in preventing foreclosure and monopolization, comparing per-se rules (form-based)
and discriminating rules (e⁄ect-based). See on this point Gual et al (2005) and Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009).
￿4 ￿￿rm is ￿ned with di⁄erent probability according to the social consequences of the action,
an instance of e⁄ect-based legal standard. Finally, when the new action is very likely to be
harmful, the policy reduces progressively the research investment up to complete deterrence
of research, coming back to per-se prohibition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 sets the ￿rst best benchmark. Section 4 analyzes the ￿rm￿ s choices regarding the
action and the investment in research. Section 5 and its subsections identify the optimal
polices. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a model with a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm and a benevolent enforcer that may
commit mistakes. The ￿rm can choose one among several known and lawful actions or
invest in learning to identify a new action, whose private and social e⁄ects are ex-ante
unknown.
The key issue that we wish to explore is the optimal design of ￿nes and accuracy when
private innovative activity is important and enforcers are subject to judgement errors.
The ￿rm can choose the status-quo action a0 (planting traditional seeds, o⁄ering an
untied application) with associated pro￿ts ￿(a0) and welfare W(a0): we normalize these
two measures to zero, i.e. ￿(a0) = W(a0) = 0. Action a0 is the most pro￿table among the
known and legal actions that the ￿rm is able to implement without investing in learning. It
is correctly recognized by the enforcer in terms of its nature (a0) and social consequences
(W(a0)).
Alternatively, if the research activity has been successful, the ￿rm can consider a new
action a (innovation), with associated pro￿t ￿(a) = ￿ > 0.6 Depending on the state of
nature s, the social consequences of the new action di⁄er. With probability ￿, a bad state
s = b occurs, and the new action has a negative social externality, W(a) = Wb(a) = W < 0.
In this case, private incentives con￿ ict with social welfare. With probability 1￿￿, instead,
a good state s = g materializes and the new action improves welfare, W(a) = Wg(a) =
W > ￿ > 0. In this case, there is no con￿ ict between private and social incentives, since
6In this paper we consider just one possible new action resulting from the learning e⁄ort, rather than a
set of new actions. In Immordino, Pagano and Polo (2009) we analyze, in the case of no errors, the case of
multiple actions and the issue of marginal deterrence. Even in the present simpli￿ed environment, however,
an issue of marginal deterrence arises since the enforcer can in￿ uence the choice between the new action a
and the status quo action a0. Notice that the action that is privately more pro￿table (a) is also the one
that is more socially damaging in the bad state. Since errors make the analysis more complex, we prefer to
maintain the model simple without losing insights on this important issue of law enforcement.
￿5 ￿the innovation improves both the pro￿ts of the ￿rm and social welfare. The three elements
￿, W and W summarize the "economic model" considered by the ￿rm and the enforcer,
that describes the ex-ante possible outcomes of the innovative activity. We assume that
the enforcer and the ￿rm share the same priors on these e⁄ects. In our examples, ￿ is the
prior probability that the GM seeds will be hazardous to public health, or that the new
tied software application, when introduced in the market, will foreclose alternative software
packages.
While the ￿rm knows from the beginning how to implement the status-quo action a0,
carrying out the new action requires an investment in learning (experiment with GM seeds,
create a new tied application), which accordingly will be referred to as ￿research￿ . If the
research investment is successful, the ￿rm will discover how to implement the new action
a. In this case, the ￿rm also learns the state of nature s, i.e. whether its innovation is
socially harmful or bene￿cial. Proceeding with our examples, the biotech company learns
not only how to produce new GM seeds, but also the dangers that they pose to public health
and the damages that it might face under the prevailing liability rules. And the software
company, once the new application is created, is able to predict whether in the current
market conditions it will foreclose the alternative packages or not.
The amount of resources I that the ￿rm invests in research determines its chances of
success: for simplicity, the ￿rm￿ s probability p(I) of learning how to carry out the new
action a is assumed to be linear in I, i.e. p(I) = I with I 2 [0;1]. The cost of learning is
increasing and convex in the ￿rm￿ s investment. For simplicity we assume c(I) = cI2
2 with
c > W (1)
to ensure an internal solution in all regimes.
The institutional framework in the design and enforcement of norms is as follows. The
legislator writes the legal rule, which speci￿es under what circumstances the actions are
legal or not, and the admitted ￿ne. The enforcement o¢ cials seek evidence on the ￿rm￿ s
action and on the associated social consequences, and may commit errors in this latter task.
Since the legislator and the enforcer are assumed to be benevolent, we can analyze their
choice as if they are taken by a single agent, that we call from here on the enforcer.
The legal rule identi￿es some circumstances that make the new action legal or unlawful.
In general we can adapt this setting to a wide range of formal frameworks: for instance, the
norm may state that the new action is illegal whenever it occurs together with contingencies
x1;:::;xn, a case that is reminiscent of more or less articulated per-se rules.7 Alternatively,
illegality may be related to the e⁄ects of the action, as required under a rule of reason
7Drawing on antitrust legislation, for instance, a very simple per-se rule would consider as illegal the
practice of resale price maintenance when adopted by a ￿rm with a market share larger than x%. A more
￿6 ￿approach. It is important to stress that our analysis can be adapted to either of the two
cases. All that matters is that, at the time of the innovative investment, the elements that
the legal rule identi￿es in order to assess the lawfulness of the new action are not known
with certainty. With this important caveat in mind, we consider a legal rule written as
follows, which allows us to greatly simplify the notation in the analysis:
The action a0 is lawful; the (new) action a is illegal if ex-post socially dam-
aging, i.e. if s = b and therefore W(a) < 0. The illegal action is sanctioned
according to a ￿ne f chosen in the interval [0;F].
For instance, the legal rule prohibits the commercialization of hazardous seeds or the
adoption of practices that foreclose the market to competitors.
The enforcer has ￿rst to identify the action chosen (a0 or a) and the social consequences
of the action (0 or Ws(a) for s = g;b). Obtaining evidence on these elements requires to
commit resources. We de￿ne respectively as monitoring and accuracy the activities devoted
to obtaining evidence on the action chosen and on its consequences (legality). In order
to focus the analysis on accuracy, we assume for simplicity but without loss of generality
that the resources devoted to monitoring are exogenously given and such that the enforcer
correctly recognizes with probability 1 the action chosen. When evaluating the consequences
(lawfulness) of the action, instead, it might commit errors and may invest in accuracy to
make its assessment more precise.8
More precisely, we assume that the enforcer is more accurate in assessing the e⁄ects of
the status-quo rather than the new action, that is judicial errors occur only when assessing
the e⁄ects (or, equivalently, the state of nature s) of the new action a, while the status-quo
action a0 is correctly recognized as legal. This di⁄erent degree of accuracy re￿ ects the more
compelling task of assessing new rather then well known phenomena. The enforcer when
investigating the e⁄ects of the new action receives a signal ￿ = fb;gg on the state of nature,
i.e. on the social consequences of the new action. With probability ￿I the signal is incorrect
when the true state of the world is the good one: in this case the enforcer considers action
a as unlawful when the good state occurs, committing a ￿type-I error￿ , or false negative.
articulated rule would consider resale price maintenance as illegal when adopted by a dominant ￿rm, where
this latter is identi￿ed by certain thresholds for market shares (x1), entry conditions (x2) and demand
elasticity. (x3), and when sales e⁄ort activities are irrelevant (x4). On per-se rules v. e⁄ect-based rules se
Gual et al. (2005) and Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009).
8This assumption is made only for clarity. We could consider both endogenous monitoring and accuracy.
However, the main insight can be obtained also in the present setting with exogenous and perfect monitoring.
We thank Patrick Rey for this suggestion.
￿7 ￿Conversely, with probability ￿II the signal is incorrect when the true state is the bad one,
and a ￿type-II error￿occurs, i.e. the enforcer will fail to identify a as unlawful when the
true state is the bad one, an example of false positive. Hence,
￿I = Pr(￿ = bjs = g) and ￿II = Pr(￿ = g js = b):
We assume that the signals received are informative, i.e. ￿I 6 1
2 and ￿II 6 1
2.9 Then type-i
accuracy, i = I;II, is measured by the probability of properly assessing the true state of the




, with the lowest level equal to 1
2.
The level of accuracy can be improved by committing additional resources to obtain a
more precise assessment of the e⁄ects. As we argued in the introduction, accuracy can be
re￿ned decreasing type-I, type-II or both types of errors. By adopting di⁄erent protocols of
investigation and standards of proof and by committing more resources, the legislator can
reduce selectively type-I or type-II errors or he can symmetrically improve the assessment
reducing both types of errors.10
We assume that the cost of obtaining a given type-i accuracy i = I;II, is increasing
and convex in accuracy 1￿￿i. More precisely, for type-i accuracy,i = I;II, the cost for the
enforcer is gi(1 ￿ ￿i), with g0
i > 0 and g00









and lim￿i!0 gi(:) = lim￿i!0 g0
i(:) = 1.
In our setting, the ￿rm has to pay a ￿ne f with probability ￿I if the new action is
socially bene￿cial, and with probability 1￿￿II when it is socially harmful. Given the norm,
we may have two di⁄erent cases, according to the policy chosen by the enforcer. If she does
not invest in accuracy, ￿I = 1 ￿ ￿II = 1
2 and the new action is treated in the same way in
both states of the world. This is an instance of per-se legality (if combined with f = 0) or
per se illegality (when f > 0) rule. When instead the enforcer improves accuracy we have
￿I < 1 ￿ ￿II and the ￿ne is more likely when the action is socially harmful. The norm is
then applied according to a discriminating (e⁄ect-based) legal standard.
Given the chosen level of accuracy, the enforcer evaluates the action according to a signal
￿ = b;g (possibly wrong), and imposes a ￿ne according to the perceived state of the world
and the action observed. The ￿ne will be zero following a status-quo action, i.e., f(a0) = 0
9Assuming that, absent any accuracy e⁄ort, the probability of either error being
1
2 is purely conventional.
We might, for instance, assume that a minimum level of accuracy (a maximum probability of error ￿ <
1
2)
must be ensured in order to avoid an overruling in the appeal phase. In this case all our arguments would
apply to the additional resources devoted to improve accuracy beyond that minimum level, while the cost of
accuracy would have a ￿xed component.
10As Katsoulakos and Ulph correctly observe, accuracy depends also on the legal standard adopted. If
socially damaging actions are consided as illegal by the norm, and a per-se rule is adopted to enforce the
norm, it is more likely to commit errors compared with an e⁄ect-based (discriminating) legal standard.
￿8 ￿(with no error). If instead, the observed action is a and the signal suggest the bad state,
the selected action a is considered unlawful and it is ￿ned, i.e., f(aj￿ = b) = f. Conversely,
if the good state is signalled, a is lawful and no ￿ne is set, i.e., f(aj￿ = g) = 0:
The timing of the model is as follows. At time 0 nature chooses the state of the world
s = fg;bg which is not observed by any agent. Agents know that the probability of the
bad state is ￿ > 0. At time 1, given the legal rule, the enforcer commits to a certain ￿ne
f and to accuracies ￿I and ￿II. At time 2; having observed the policy set by the enforcer,
the ￿rm chooses the research investment I and learns with probability p(I) = I how to
implement the new action a and the state of the world. At time 3, the ￿rm chooses an
action, conditional on what it learnt in the previous stage. Finally, at time 4 the action
chosen determines the private pro￿ts and the social welfare; the enforcer collects evidence
(with errors) and possibly levies a ￿ne.
3 First best
As the opportunities created by research generate either positive or negative externalities,
depending on the state of nature, public policy may be bene￿cial. To evaluate the bene￿ts
of public interventions, it is useful to benchmark them against the ￿rst-best outcome (FB),
which would obtain if the enforcer could control ￿rms￿choices I and a directly.
Let us denote by as with s = b;g the action chosen by the ￿rm ￿ if research is successful
￿ in the bad and in the good state, respectively. If the research activity is successful,
unconstrained welfare maximization calls for the new action in the good state and the
status-quo action in the bad state, that is ag = a and ab = a0. For given level of the
innovative investment I, the ￿rst-best expected welfare is therefore









which is increasing in the likelihood of the good state (1 ￿ ￿) and in the associated welfare
gain W, and decreasing in the marginal cost of innovative activity c. Then, the expected







In what follows, the policy maker is assumed not to control ￿rms￿choices directly, but
to in￿ uence them via penalties: ￿rms are free to implement their preferred action, but they
￿9 ￿are aware that public intervention may occur ex post in the form of ￿nes, whenever social
harm is assessed to have occurred (with errors).
4 Firm￿ s choices: actions and research
At stage 3; depending on whether its research was successful or not, the ￿rm chooses an
action. Two elements a⁄ect the selection of the pro￿t maximizing action, namely the out-
come of the research investment and the enforcement policy. If the innovative activity has
been unsuccessful, the only feasible choice is the status-quo action a0 with associated pro￿ts
￿(a0) = 0 and welfare W(a0) = 0. If instead the innovative activity has been successful,
the ￿rm is able to take also the new action a, and in this case the enforcement policy a⁄ects
the ￿rm￿ s choice.
In the good state (s = g) the action a is not socially harmful and therefore, if correctly
assessed, it is considered lawful. Nevertheless, with probability ￿I the authority￿ s perceived
state of the world is the bad one (￿ = b) and the action is erroneously judged unlawful.
Then, when ag = a the expected pro￿ts are equal to ￿ ￿ ￿If: If, alternatively, the ￿rm
chooses the action ag = a0, pro￿ts are equal to 0 and there is no error in enforcement.
Turning to the bad state (s = b), the new action a, if correctly recognized, is socially
harmful, and therefore unlawful, but the ￿ne is levied only with probability (1 ￿ ￿II) since
with probability ￿II the enforcer receives the wrong signal ￿ = g. In this case when the
￿rm chooses ab = a, the expected pro￿ts are equal to ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿II)f: To break the ties, we
assume that when indi⁄erent the ￿rm chooses the welfare maximizing action. Hence, when
￿ ￿ ￿If = 0, since the state is good, the ￿rm chooses a. Instead, if ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿II)f = 0,
being in the bad state, the ￿rm will select the status-quo action a0. Finally, it is simple to
check that ￿
￿I > ￿
(1￿￿II) or, equivalently, ￿I + ￿II 6 1.11
It is interesting to notice that more type-I accuracy, i.e. a smaller ￿I; makes the choice
of the new action a more convenient in the good state, while more type-II accuracy, i.e.
a smaller ￿II; makes the choice of the new action less attractive in the bad state. This
observation is consistent with the received view that accuracy exerts a positive impact on
the ability of the legislator to implement the desired ￿rm￿ s actions, what is usually called
marginal deterrence.
The next Lemma directly follows from the discussion above, and shows that according
to the outcome of research (successful or unsuccessful), and according to the policy chosen
by the legislator (the level of the ￿ne f and the type-I and type-II errors ￿I and ￿II), only












￿10 ￿Lemma 1(Actions Choice): If research is successful three cases may arise:
(i) (status-quo action - SQ): for f > ￿
￿I; the ￿rm chooses the status quo action in both
states, i.e. ag = ab = a0;
(ii) (e¢ cient actions - EA): for ￿
￿I > f > ￿
(1￿￿II); the ￿rm chooses the status quo
action in the bad state and the new action in the good state, i.e. ag = a and ab = a0;
(iii)(new action - NA): for f < ￿
(1￿￿II); the ￿rm chooses the new action in both states,
that is ag = ab = a;
(iv) If reearch is unsuccessful, the ￿rm chooses the status quo action a0:
At stage 2, knowing the accuracies and the ￿ne, the ￿rm chooses its research investment
I so as to maximize its expected pro￿ts, anticipating the optimal actions that it will choose
at stage 3. The ￿rm learns how to carry out the new project with probability p(I) = I and
its expected pro￿ts at this stage are:




where the ￿rst term is the expected gain from research (net of the expected ￿nes), and
the second term is the cost of research. Notice that, since the investment is chosen before
observing the true state of nature, the expected pro￿ts depend on both the policies adopted
when the new action is lawful and when it is instead unlawful. The pro￿t maximizing
research investment is described in the following result for the three di⁄erent action choices
described in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Investment choice): The research investment I chosen by the ￿rm in the









c < IFB for ￿




c Q IFB for f < ￿
(1￿￿II):
(5)
In the ￿rst two cases the investment is lower than the ￿rst best while in case (iii) we may
have under or over-investment.
Notice that due to assumption (1) b I(:) 2 [0;1]. Moreover, in the e¢ cient action case
(EA) only type-I errors ￿I a⁄ect the investment, since in the bad state the ￿rm chooses the
status-quo action which is correctly assessed by the legislator. Less accuracy (a higher ￿I),
by increasing over-deterrence, reduces the expected pro￿ts and the investment in innovative
activity. In the new action case (NA), instead, the ￿rm always chooses the new action a and
the investment is discouraged by more over-deterrence (higher ￿I) or less under-deterrence
￿11 ￿(lower ￿II). In this case, therefore, the two accuracies a⁄ect the innovative investment in
opposite directions.
By direct comparison of (5) with (3) it is immediate to see that there is always under-
investment in research in the status-quo and e¢ cient action cases, while in the new action
case it is possible to have both under or overinvestment. Then, case EA ￿ with the en-
forcer that implements the e¢ cient action in each state ￿ is not necessarily the preferred
outcome once we take into account the insu¢ cient level of research investment. Indeed, the
underinvestment result, together with the cost of accuracy, explains why the e¢ cient action
case will not be always the optimal one.
5 Optimal enforcement policies
After having identi￿ed the ￿rm￿ s choice of action and research, we study the optimal policy
in two steps: ￿rst, we identify the optimal ￿ne and accuracies for any implemented course of
actions, namely the status quo, the e¢ cient and the new action policies. Then, we compare
welfare in the di⁄erent scenarios selecting the overall optimal policy.
In the present setting, the legislator controls three instruments: ￿I and ￿II, which are
costly and the ￿ne f, that is a pure transfer. The expected welfare, taking into account the





(SQ) 0 ￿ gI(:) ￿ gII(:) ￿ 0 for f > ￿
￿I;
(EA) b I(:)(1 ￿ ￿)W ￿ gI(:) ￿ gII(:) ￿ c
b I(:)2
2 ; for ￿
￿I > f > ￿
(1￿￿II);
(NA) b I(:)￿W(￿) ￿ gI(:) ￿ gII(:) ￿ c
b I(:)2
2 ; for f < ￿
(1￿￿II);
(6)
where ￿W(￿) ￿ [￿W + (1 ￿ ￿)W] is the expected welfare change due to the new action a,
while the last three terms correspond to the public costs of accuracies and the private costs
of the research investment.
5.1 The status quo policy (SQ)
The ￿rst regime, identi￿ed by the condition f > ￿
￿I, is also the simplest to study. In this
case the legislator sets the ￿ne at such a high level that, in case of successful innovative
activity, the ￿rm prefers to stick to the status-quo action a0 in both states. Indeed, due
to the errors the ￿ne is given in both states, and the expected pro￿ts from the innovative
investment are non positive, inducing the ￿rm not to invest in research, i.e. b I = 0. The
cheapest way to implement this regime is by choosing no accuracy and a su¢ ciently high
￿ne, that is, ￿￿
I = ￿￿
II = 1
2 and f > 2￿: The expected welfare is then
EW￿
SQ(￿) = 0; for any ￿:
￿12 ￿The status-quo outcome is consistent with a legal standard that always prohibits the new
action and ￿nes it with the same probability (equal to 1
2) no matter what are its social
consequences, what we could call a per-se illegality rule.
5.2 The e¢ cient action policy (EA)
In the e¢ cient action regime ￿ne and accuracies are set so as to implement the welfare
maximizing actions, that is, ag = a in the good state and ab = a0 in the bad state. However,
as mentioned in Lemma 2, this positive e⁄ect is counterbalanced by a level of investment in
research that is too low compared to the ￿rst best for any given probability of the bad state
￿: In other words, in this regime the enforcer￿ s optimal policy aims at reaching both marginal
deterrence and the right incentives to innovate. The enforcer uses the policy instruments to
solve the following problem:











Recalling that in this regime there is always underinvestment in innovative activity, it
is immediate to see that the second constraint must be binding. Since from Lemma 2,
b I =
(1￿￿)(￿￿￿If)
c , lowering f makes the ￿rst constraint slacker while still inducing the wel-
fare maximizing actions, and mitigates the underinvestment in research more cheaply than











We assume that the cost of accuracy are su¢ ciently convex. Then, the following Propo-
sition, proved in the Appendix, establishes the optimal policy in the e¢ cient action regime.
Proposition 1 (The e¢ cient action policy): The optimal policy entails an e⁄ect-












and f = ￿
(1￿￿￿
II) 2 (￿;2￿) for ￿ 2 (0;1)
and a per-se illegality legal standard with ￿￿
I = ￿￿
II = 1
2 and f = 2￿ for ￿ = 1: Moreover,
if gI(:) = gII(:) = g(:) then ￿￿
I < ￿￿






















￿ gI(:) ￿ gII(:)
and is decreasing and concave in the probability of the bad state ￿:
It is interesting to notice that all the instruments ￿ both types of accuracy as well as the
￿ne f ￿ are used. To understand the di⁄erent e⁄ects at work it is useful to discuss the result
￿13 ￿in detail. The level of investment in the e¢ cient action case is determined by the ￿ne f and
the type-I error ￿I. Since the investment is below the ￿rst-best, the legislator is willing to
boost it by reducing the ￿ne f at the lowest level consistent with the implementation of the
e¢ cient action a0 in the bad state, i.e., at f = ￿
(1￿￿￿
II). This corner solution suggests that
there is a tension, in the optimal policy design, between implementing the e¢ cient actions, a
goal that calls for a su¢ ciently high ￿ne, and giving the proper incentives to the innovative
activity, an objective that instead would require to reduce the ￿ne. For this reason, reducing
the ￿ne at f = ￿
(1￿￿￿
II) is not enough, and the legislator improves both type of accuracies
to further boost the investment while still implementing the e¢ cient actions.
Hence, both accuracies are implemented, acting as complements in the optimal policy.
Notice that since the enforcer invests in accuracy the ￿ne is given with di⁄erent probabilities
￿￿
I and 1￿￿￿
II in the two states of the world, implying that the legal standard discriminates
between socially bene￿cial and socially damaging actions, an instance of e⁄ect-based legal
standard.
Reducing type-I errors ￿I, has a direct positive e⁄ect on the investment that is stronger
than the second, indirect, one through ￿II, explaining the asymmetric level of investment in
accuracies. This latter result calls for an asymmetric protocol of investigation, that allows
to reduce di⁄erently type I and type II errors. To illustrate this point, consider the following
example, drawn from antitrust policy. Suppose that the welfare e⁄ects of a given practice
of a dominant ￿rm depend, in decreasing order, on four fundamental variables: market
shares, entry conditions, demand elasticity and cost e¢ ciencies. If we just consider the
action chosen (a0 or a) with no additional element, we opt for no accuracy (￿I = ￿II = 1
2)
and just conclude for illegality if we observe the new action, an instance of (form-based)
per-se illegality.
If we instead opt for greater accuracy, we might proceed in di⁄erent ways in assessing
additional variables, improving accuracy selectively on one or the other type of error. A
case of selective accuracy can be illustrated by the following protocol of investigation. 1)
The enforcer considers ￿rst the market share of the dominant ￿rm: if this is below a certain
threshold the enforcer clears the case, if instead the market share is above the threshold
the investigation proceeds to the second step (entry conditions); 2) if entry is easy the
case is cleared, while di¢ cult entry leads to the third step (demand elasticity); 3) If the
demand is elastic the case is cleared while inelastic demand required to move to the last step
(e¢ ciencies); 4) substantial e¢ ciencies call for clearing the case while low cost reductions
determine a negative judgement.
This example illustrates a protocol of investigation in which further levels of accuracy
are implemented asymmetrically, requiring a more compelling standard of proof every time
a negative signal ￿ = b is assessed, while the ￿rm is judged innocent if a positive signals
￿14 ￿is obtained at any stage of the investigation. This way the probability of condemning an
innocent ￿rm (type-I error) is reduced much more than that of acquitting a guilty one.12.
5.3 The new action policy (NA)
In the new action regime the legislator chooses a ￿ne low enough so that the pro￿ts from the
new action exceed the maximum ￿ne, implying that, if the innovative e⁄ort is successful, the
￿rm always prefers to choose the new action. Although in this case the legislator renounces
to a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s choice of actions, a role for deterrence remains through the policy e⁄ect
on the research investment
I =
￿ ￿ [￿ (1 ￿ ￿II) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿I]f
c
:
The relevant ￿rst order conditions are:
@EW
@f






















c < 0, @b I
@￿I = ￿
(1￿￿)f
c 6 0 and @b I
@￿II =
￿f
c > 0. The three
derivatives have the same structure. The ￿rst term captures the marginal e⁄ect of the policy
variables on expected welfare, through the impact on the research investment. The second
term, which is zero in the case of ￿nes, is the marginal cost of the policy. The optimal choice
of the policy variables, therefore, depends on the sign of the marginal social value of the
research investment, ￿W(￿) ￿ cb I that can be positive or negative. Hence, in general we
may expect internal as well as corner solutions.
To characterize the optimal policy, we substitute the optimal investment b I chosen by the
￿rm according to (5) in [￿W(￿) ￿ cb I] = 0, and we solve for ￿. The result is the following
set of loci:
b ￿(f;￿I;￿II) =
W ￿ ￿ + ￿If
W ￿ W + ￿If ￿ (1 ￿ ￿II)f
;
which describe, for given policy parameters (f;￿I;￿II), the probability of the bad state
￿ that makes the marginal social value of the research investment equal to zero. The
12Di⁄erent levels of type-I accuracy may be obtained then by interrupting the protocol of investigation at
stage 3 or 2.
￿15 ￿equilibrium analysis focusses on two relevant loci corresponding to di⁄erent combinations
of policy parameters:










along which the research investment is welfare neutral when f = 0 and ￿I = ￿II = 1
2, and










corresponding to the policy parameters f = 2￿ and ￿I = ￿II = 1
2. This latter policy
combination induces the ￿rm not to invest in research, i.e. b I = 0. Moreover, at ￿ = ￿1 the
new action a gives a zero welfare gain, that is ￿W(￿1) = 0. Finally, notice that 1 > ￿1 >
￿0 > 0:
The following Proposition, proved in the Appendix, characterizes the optimal policy
which implements the NA regime for di⁄erent likelihood of the bad state ￿.
Proposition 2 (The new action policy): We can distinguish the following regions:
￿ If ￿ 2 [0; ￿0] the optimal policy entails a per-se legality rule (laissez-faire) with
f = 0 and ￿￿
I = ￿￿
II = 1













f￿ = 2[￿ ￿ ￿W(￿)] 2 (0;2￿):
The expected welfare is strictly positive and equal to EWNA(￿) =
￿W(￿)2
2c > 0; for
￿ ! ￿1 we have b I(￿) =
￿W(￿)
c ! 0 and EWNA(￿) =
￿W(￿)2
2c ! 0.
In the new action regime the enforcer renouces to elicit the e¢ cient action and concen-
trates his e⁄orts on a⁄ecting the research investment. She does not invest in accuracy and
￿nes with the same probability 1=2 both bene￿cial and harmful action. Hence, the enforcer
in this case adopts per-se legal standards. When the likelihood of the bad state ￿ is small,
i.e. below ￿0, the research investment is socially desirable. The optimal policy requires that
the new action is not penalized (f = 0) even if ex-post it is found to be welfare decreas-
ing in the bad state. The ex-ante positive e⁄ect on research incentives, indeed, more than
counterbalances the ex-post limited losses. Accuracy in this case is irrelevant because the
￿rm does not pay any ￿ne no matter what is the ￿nal decision. This policy is equivalent to
laissez-faire or a per-se legality legal standard.
￿16 ￿Once we move to a region where social losses are more likely, between ￿0 and ￿1 a
laissez-faire regime is too lax and we want to marginally limit the research investment.
This result is obtained using the cheapest tool, i.e. increasing the ￿ne without spending
on accuracy. The new action is therefore sanctioned with the same probability (1
2) in both
states of the world, a case of per-se illegality legal standard. In this case the new action
leads to a positive but decreasing expected welfare variation, i.e. ￿W(￿) > 0, while the
marginal social value of the research investment, taking into account its costs, is kept at zero
by progressively reducing I. At the upper bound ￿1, the innovative investment is completely
discouraged, and the ￿rm never learns how to implement the new action. In this case, the
welfare remains at the status-quo (zero) level and the issue of marginal deterrence, that is
the ability to in￿ uence the ex-post choice of the action, becomes irrelevant.
5.4 Optimal policy with respect to ￿
The three cases considered involve a di⁄erent use of the instruments available and in the
(implicit) legal standard adopted. If the legislator favors the goal of implementing the
e¢ cient actions (EA), a combination of ￿nes and accuracies is needed, with a bias in favor
of type-I accuracy. In this case, indeed, the policy tries to a⁄ect at the same time the choice
of the innovative activity and of the actions, so that more tools are required. Moreover,
the norm is applied di⁄erently in the good and the bad state, implying a discrimination
consistent with an e⁄ect-based legal standard. When instead the enforcer renounces to
a⁄ect the choice of the actions (NA) and focusses only on the choice of the investment,
a single tool su¢ ces, and she uses the costless ￿nes without promoting accuracy. Finally,
if the new action must be avoided (SQ) ￿nes are set at a su¢ ciently high level with the
aim of inducing the ￿rm to refrain from investing in innovative activity and no resources
are wasted to increase accuracy. In the latter two cases, the policy acts in the same way
whether the action is socially bene￿cial or harmful, and is therefore equivalent to a per-se
(legality or illegality) legal standard.
Once identi￿ed the policies consistent with the implementation of di⁄erent ￿rm￿ s choices,
we want to compare their expected welfare levels and ￿nd out the overall optimal policy
according to di⁄erent levels of ￿, the probability that the new action is socially harmful. The
following Proposition, proved in the Appendix, establishes the optimal policy for di⁄erent
values of ￿:
Proposition 3 (Overall optimal policy): 9 a e ￿ < ￿1 such that the NA policy is
preferred to the EA one i⁄ ￿ 6 e ￿ and vice-versa. The SQ policy is never chosen.
The previous Proposition shows that when the new action is unlike to give social losses,
￿17 ￿the enforcer focusses on the research incentives promoting laissez-faire or moderate ￿nes,
without investing in accuracy. Conversely, for a higher likelihood of social harm, the enforcer
prefers to elicit the e¢ cient actions focussing on marginal deterrence even at the cost of
depressing ￿rm￿ s research investment. This outcome is obtained by a combination of ￿nes
and asymmetric accuracies, with a stronger e⁄ort to reduce type-I error than type-II errors.
When the probability of harmful innovation is very high, the policy reduces the research
investment to zero, implementing in the limit the status-quo.
Our result has implications also in terms of the legal standard that is adopted by the
enforcer, an issue analyzed in Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009). For ￿ 2 [0;￿0] the new action
is not sanctioned in either state of the world, and is therefore treated equivalently to a
per-se legality rule. For ￿ 2 (￿0; e ￿] the new action is sanctioned with increasing ￿nes
and with the same probability (1=2) in both states of the world, without discriminating
its social e⁄ects. Hence, in this region the policy is equivalent to a per-se illegality rule
enforced with increasing ￿nes. Once we enter into the e¢ cient action region, for ￿ 2 (e ￿;1)
accuracy implies a di⁄erent probability of ￿nes in the two states of the world. This policy is
therefore consistent with a discriminating (e⁄ect-based) rule. Finally, for ￿ = 1 no accuracy
is adopted and we are back to a per-se illegality rule.
6 Conclusions
In the traditional model of law enforcement a private agent selects an illegal action from
a set of privately convenient but socially damaging actions by comparing their expected
bene￿ts and ￿nes. Marginal deterrence, in this setting, is the key e⁄ect.
In this paper, the agents ￿rst have to invest resources in learning ￿what we call research
￿and then, if successful, they are able to choose a new action that ex post may be welfare
enhancing or reducing (illegal). The optimal policy, determining the probability of being
￿ned ex post, a⁄ects both the expected pro￿ts from the new action and the ex-ante incentives
to invest in research. In our setting the instruments of the legislator are the level of ￿nes
and the level of accuracy in assessing the social consequences (legality) of the actions.
The policy a⁄ects the ￿rm￿ s choices on two grounds: by in￿ uencing the ex-post choice
of the action, an instance of marginal deterrence, and through the ex-ante incentives to
research investment. The two goals are not always aligned, and the relative importance of
the two e⁄ects shapes the optimal policy.
We have shown that the likelihood of social harm ￿ drives the design of the optimal
policy: for a su¢ ciently low probability ￿, the enforcer does not invest in accuracy and
focusses on a⁄ecting the research incentives through zero (per-se legality legal standard) or
￿18 ￿low ￿nes (moderately enforced per-se illegality rule), allowing the ￿rm to choose the new
action in any state and disregarding marginal deterrence. Conversely, for a higher likelihood
of social harm ￿, the enforcer prefers to improve marginal deterrence by eliciting the ex-
post e¢ cient actions at the cost of depressing ￿rm￿ s research investment. This is obtained
through a combination of ￿nes and accuracies with a bias in favor of type-I accuracy and
the adoption of asymmetric protocols of investigation. By investing in accuracy the enforcer
sanctions the new action with di⁄erent probabilities when harmful or bene￿cial, adopting a
discriminating (e⁄ect-based) legal standard. In the limit, when the social harm of innovation
is almost certain, the policy completely displaces the research investment through a very
high ￿ne in any contingency (per-se illegality legal standard).
￿19 ￿Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting, f = ￿
(1￿￿II) in (7) and maximizing with respect
to ￿I and ￿II we get the following ￿rst order and complementary slackness conditions, where
￿ is a Lagrange multiplier:
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for ￿ < 1 and A = 0 for ￿ = 1.
Consider ￿rst the case where ￿ < 1: the RHS in (11) and (12) are positive for any ￿ > 0,
then the Inada conditions g0


















































































that is positive when, g00
I and g00
II are su¢ ciently large (only the last term in the curly
brackets is negative). Turning to the comparison of the levels of accuracy, when A > 0, i.e.,
for ￿ < 1, since ￿￿
I + ￿￿




II) < 1; the ￿rst order conditions imply that:
g0







I (1 ￿ ￿￿
I) < g0
I (1 ￿ ￿￿
I)(> 0):
We then conclude that when the two types of accuracy entail the same costs, i.e. gI(:) =
gII(:) = g(:) we have 1 ￿ ￿￿
II < 1 ￿ ￿￿
I and therefore ￿￿
I < ￿￿
II for ￿ < 1.
Consider now the case ￿ = 1 and A = 0. Then, ￿ must be zero as well. We prove this
by contradiction. Suppose that ￿ > 0. In this case (11) and (12) are positive, implying
￿20 ￿that ￿￿
I + ￿￿
II < 1 so that the ￿rst constraint does not bind. Then, in the complementary
slackness condition the term in parenthesis is positive and ￿ = 0. Hence, for ￿ = 1 we have
















































where the ￿rst term (direct e⁄ect) is negative and the last two terms are zero due to the
FOC (envelope theorem). Di⁄erentiating one more time and taking into account that
@EW
@￿I = @EW









































< 0 and @2EW
@￿I@￿II < 0. Moreover
@￿￿
I





i are su¢ ciently large. Hence, the ￿rst term is positive but the other three terms are
negative. The expected welfare is then always decreasing in ￿ and concave when g00
i are
su¢ ciently positive and large so to neutralize the only positive term.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the ￿rst order conditions (8), (9) and (10).
If ￿ 2 [0; ￿0), when f = 0 and ￿I = ￿II = 1
2 the marginal social value of the innovative
activity [￿W(￿)￿cb I] is positive and therefore @EW
@f < 0: in this region increasing the ￿ne f
reduces the incentive to innovate and the expected welfare. Consequently, the optimal policy
is to set the ￿ne f￿ = 0, i.e. not to penalize the new action. In this case @b I













2) = 0. This outcome is therefore equivalent to the one arising if the new
action was lawful, i.e. a laissez-faire or a per-se legality rule. Notice that the optimal policy
parameters are indeed those corresponding to the threshold ￿0: this ensures that below ￿0,
the marginal social value of innovative activity is indeed positive when the optimal policy
is chosen. At ￿ = ￿0 the same argument holds with [￿W(￿) ￿ cb I] = 0. Substituting the






that is decreasing and linear in
￿. At the upper bound ￿ = ￿0 we have b I = ￿
c and ￿W(￿) = cb I = ￿. Substituting in the
expected welfare for ￿ = ￿0 we get EWNA(￿0) = ￿2
c > 0. Hence, EWNA(￿) > 0 for any
￿ 2 [0; ￿0].
If ￿ 2 (￿0; ￿1); once we move above ￿0 for f = 0 the marginal social value of innovative
activity becomes negative and @EW
@f > 0, suggesting to increase the ￿ne. Notice that a higher
￿21 ￿￿ne a⁄ects [￿W(￿) ￿ cb I] reducing the investment b I and its marginal cost and increasing
the marginal social value of innovation. The optimal ￿ne f￿ is determined by the condition
￿W(￿) ￿ cb I(f￿) = 0. When f = f￿ the ￿rst order conditions for ￿￿
I and ￿￿
II are solved for
￿￿
I = ￿￿




2) = 0. Substituting the expressions of ￿W(￿) and b I
and solving we obtain
f￿ = 2
￿
￿ ￿ ￿W ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)W
￿
:
The second order condition then is @2EW=@f2 = ￿1=4c < 0, since the other variables
are set at the corner solutions. Substituting the optimal policy in (5) and (6) we get
b I(￿) =
￿W(￿)
c > 0 and EWNA(￿) =
￿W(￿)2
2c > 0; which is greater than zero and decreasing
for ￿ 2 (￿0; ￿1). Notice also that for ￿ ! ￿1 the innovative investment b I(￿) and the
expected welfare EWNA(￿) tend to zero. In this case, the ￿rm never learns how to implement
the new action.
Finally, if ￿ 2 [￿1;1] the optimal policy is not determined. Notice in fact that f￿ is
increasing in ￿ and tends to 2￿ when ￿ ! ￿1. However, for such a high ￿ne the ￿rm would
never choose the new action a if the innovative investment is successful. But with such a
high ￿ne no investment is exerted.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the expression of the expected welfare under the
three policies:
































for ￿ 2 [0;￿0]
￿W(￿)2
2c for ￿ 2 (￿0;￿1):
From the previous analysis the following facts hold. The ￿rst expression is always equal
to zero. The expected welfare under the e¢ cient action policy is positive, decreasing and
concave in ￿. The expected welfare under the new action policy is positive, decreasing,
initially linear and then convex in ￿. Moreover, EWNA(￿) ! 0 for ￿ ! ￿1. Hence, the SQ
regime never (strictly) dominates for any ￿ 2 [0;1].
Now, let us compare EWEA(￿) and EWNA(￿) at ￿ = 0. We obtain








+ gI(:) + gII(:) > 0;
implying that for low probabilities of the bad state ￿ the NA policy is preferred.
Secondly, EWNA(￿1) ! 0 for ￿ ! ￿1 < 1 while EWEA(1) = 0. Since both expressions
are always decreasing in ￿ with @2EWEA
@￿2 < 0 and @2EWNA
@￿2 > 0, they intersect only once.
Hence, there exists a value e ￿ such that EWEA(￿) Q EWNA(￿) for ￿ Q e ￿.
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